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increasing minors' access to efficient means of terminating un-
wanted pregnancies.
KATHLEEN MCGILVRAY
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America: Exercise of Due-
on-Sale Clauses as an Unreasonable Restraint
Upon Alienation
The author examines the history of due-on-sale clauses, trac-
ing its treatment in the Supreme Court of California to its most
recent pronouncement, where the court found the clause to be an
unreasonable restraint on alienation absent proof from the insti-
tutional lender that enforcement was necessary to protect against
risk of default or impairment of its security. The author con-
cludes that the rationale of the court reasonably balances the
common law rule against restraint on alienation and the lender's
interest.
In July 1973, Birdie, Fred and Dorothy Mans purchased real
property and obtained financing through defendant, Bank of Amer-
ica. The bank received a promissory note, secured by a deed of trust,
which contained a standard due-on-sale clause. The clause pro-
vided, inter alia, that if the Manses sold the property, the defendant
bank could, at its option, accelerate the maturity of the loan.'
Two years later, the Manses sold the property to plaintiff, Cyn-
thia Wellenkamp, for the amount of their equity in the property
along with plaintiff's assumption of the outstanding balance on the
Manses' loan from defendant. When the bank was notified of the
transfer of title and received plaintiff's check for the monthly pay-
ment of the loan, it returned the check and notified plaintiff of its
intention to accelerate the loan payment unless plaintiff agreed to
accept a one and one-quarter percent increase per annum in the
interest rate on the original loan. When the plaintiff would not agree
to the higher interest rate, defendant elected to file a notice of
default and sell the property under the deed of trust.
Plaintiff filed for an injunction against enforcement of the due-
l. Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 21 Cal. 3d 943, 946, 582 P.2d 970, 972, 148 Cal. Rptr.
379, 381 (1978). The deed of trust provided that if the trustor (the Manses)
sells, conveys, alienates . . . said property or any part thereof, or any interest
therein ... or becomes divested of [his] title or any interest therein ... in any
manner or way, whether voluntarily or involuntarily .... Beneficiary shall have
the right at its option, to declare said note ... secured hereby ... immediately
due and payable without notice.
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on-sale clause and a declaration that such a clause could not be
enforced without any demonstration that the sale of the property
had impaired the defendant's security.2 The superior court sus-
tained defendant's demurrer on the ground that no cause of action
for declaratory relief had been stated. The court of appeal affirmed
the decision, finding that although a cause of action for declaratory
relief had been stated, any declaration of rights on the merits would
have been unfavorable to plaintiff and no benefit would have re-
sulted from a reversal of the erroneous judgment.3 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of California held, reversed: The exercise of a due-
on-sale clause contained in a promissory note or deed of trust consti-
tutes an unreasonable restraint on alienation of property in viola-
tion of California law unless the lender' can show that enforcement
is reasonably necessary to protect against the risk of default or im-
pairment of its security. Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal.
3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
A due-on clause is a device used in real property security trans-
actions to provide the lender with an option to declare the entire
balance of the loan and its accrued interest due and payable imme-
diately upon the occurrence of certain contingencies set out in the
deed of trust or mortgage, in the note or bond secured thereby, or
in both such instruments. Lending institutions commonly include
due-on clauses in their contracts which are contingent upon some
form of alienation of the secured property.5 While due-on-sale
clauses operate to protect the lender's interests, they may infringe
upon the borrower-seller's right of free alienation of his property.
There are two lines of cases which have developed in the United
States to provide flexibility against the common law rule voiding all
restraints on alienation.' Under the "majority doctrine," restraints
2. Id. at 947, 582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
3. Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 68 Cal. App. 3d 835, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 488 (Ct. App. 1977).
4. The court emphasized the fact that the party seeking enforcement of the due-on-sale
clause in this case was an institutional lender and limited its holding accordingly. 21 Cal. 3d
at 952 n.9, 582 P.2d at 976 n. 9, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.9.
5. 28 CAsE W. Rs. L. Riv. 493, 503 (1978).
In 1970, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation conducted a survey
of conventional mortgages (principally those used by savings and loan associa-
tions and found that over two-thirds of such mortgages included due-on-sale
clauses. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd. Adv. Op. No. 75-647, at 29 (July 30, 1975)
(entered in Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 75-366 WMB (C.D.
Cal., filed Feb. 4, 1975)).
Id. at 503 n.1.
6. 47 Miss. L.J. 331, 333 (1976). The common law rule regards the right of alienation
"as an inherent and inseparable quality of a fee estate, such that conveyance of title included
the right of free and unlimited alienation." Id. at 333 (citing 61 Am. Jun. 2D Perpetuities and
Restraints on Alienation § 94 (1972)).
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against alienation7 are invalid per se unless the restraint falls within
certain recognized exceptions.8 The specific classes of exceptions
differ in various jurisdictions, but there is substantial agreement as
to many.' Under the "minority doctrine," adopted by the Supreme
Court of California in Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 10 the facts of each
case are weighed on an ad hoc basis to determine whether the re-
straints on alienation are reasonable." If the restraints are reason-
A more practical rationale supporting the rule is that restraints on alienation
violate public policy. . . Under this view the law against restraints is justified
as a useful device avoiding grave economic and social consequences such as the
removal of property from commerce, the concentration of wealth, the limitations
of property improvements, and the impeding of debt collection. See Baker v.
Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 21111. App. 3d 42, 44, 314 N.E.2d 306, 308 (1974);
A: CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TExT ON PRoPEmrY 1008 (2d ed. 1960)..
Id. at 334 n.13 (citations omitted).
7. A restraint on alienation, as that phrase is used in this note, is a direct restraint on
the legal power of alienation. A direct restraint occurs when an instrument purports to
prohibit or penalize alienation of the property. An indirect restraint occurs when an instru-
ment attempts to accomplish some purpose other than the retraint of alienability, but its
incidental effect is to so restrain. L. SiMas & A. SMrH, THE LAw op Furu m INTEFTS § 1112
(1956). Only direct restraints are treated as possible illegal restraints on alienation. But see
Comment, Debt Acceleration of Transfer of Mortgaged Property, 29 U. MIAMI L. REv. 584,
596 (1975) (arguing that due-on-sale clause should be held invalid as unreasonable restraint
on alienation.
There are three types of direct restraints: disabling, forfeiture and promissory restraints.
4 RESTATzMENT Or PROPERTY § 404 (1944). The due-on-sale clause does not fit perfectly into
any of these categories, but it closely resembles a promissory restraint, which "refers to a
convenant in an instrument of conveyance, or to a contract, in which the promisor agrees not
to alienate the property." L. SiMas & A. SMrit, supra at § 1131. In fact, a court which found
a due-on-sale clause to be a restraint on alienation noted that it "directly and fundamentally
burdens a mortgagor's ability to alienate as surely and directly as the classical promissory
restraint." Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. & Loan As'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 166, 250 N.W.2d
804, 805, appeal denied, 400 Mich. 844 (1977) (quoting Volkmer, The Application of the
Restraint on Alienation Doctrine to Real Property Security Interests, 58 IowA L. REv. 747,
774 (1973)).
8. The major exceptions to the majority approach are: (1) the spendthrift trust and
similar trust devices; (2) restraints on the power to partition (if it does not last too long a
time); (3) restraints (particularly forfeiture) on alienation to a small group of persons classi-
fied other than by race or other social characteristics; (4) forfeiture restraints on a life or lesser
estate; (5) promissory (and sometimes forfeiture) restraints in the form of a right of preemp-
tion; (6) restraints for protection of vendor in land sales contract; (7) reasonable provisions
in articles of a business organization prohibiting transfer of shares; (8) restraints on gifts to
charities. 47 Miss. L.J. 331, 334 n.21 (1976); see Bernhard, The Minority Doctrine Concerning
Direct Restraints on Alienation, 57 MICH. L. Rsv. 1173, 1174-75 (1959).
9. Bernhard, supra note 8, at 1175; 47 Miss. L.J. 331, 334 (1976).
10. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1965); see Bernhard, supra note 8.
In Coast Bank, the supreme court issued its landmark decision upholding, for the first time,
a due-on clause which was being challenged as an illegal restraint on alienation. A California
statute stated that "[clonditions restraining alienation, when repugnant to the interest
created, are void." CAL. CIv. CODE § 711 (West 1954). Justice Traynor, writing for the Coast
Bank majority, however, recognized that this rule only forbade unreasonable restraints
against alienation. See 21 Cal. 3d at 948, 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
11. See Bernhard, supra note 8, at 1176; Volkmer, supra note 7, at 749 n.12.
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able, they are valid and enforceable. "Theoretically, when the pur-
pose behind the restraint outweighs its effect in hindering the alien-
ability of property, the standard is satisfied."' 2
In the due-on-sale situation, the borrower-seller's right to alien-
ate his property is balanced against the interests of the lender which
are protected by the clause. One such interest of the lender is the
protection of his security. If the transfer of the realty increases the
risk of future default by the borrower or future waste to the prop-
erty, it is reasonable for the lender to demand an increase in the
interest rate on the loan as compensation for the additional risks,
or to require that the maturity of the loan be accelerated. The due-
on-sale clause traditionally has had the purpose of minimizing these
special risks which face the lender when there is a subsequent trans-
fer of the property. 3 In recognition of the lender's justifiable concern
over possible impairment of its security interest, courts have uni-
formly found that due-on-sale clauses are not invalid per se. 4
Another interest of the lender, at least the institutional lender,
is to maintain its loan portfolio at prevailing interest rates." There
12. 47 Miss. L.J. 331, 336 (1976). The adoption of the justification versus quantum of
restraint test by the supreme court in Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629,
526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633, (1974), is very similar.
13. See Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in
California in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6 U.S.F.
L. Rav. 267, 271 (1972); Valensi, The Due on Sale Clause-A Dissenting Opinion, 45 L.A.B.
BULL. 121, 121 (1970); Note, Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale Clause: The Case for
Adopting Standards of Reasonableness and Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 1109, 1116
(1975); 47 Miss. L.J. 331, 338 (1976). But see 28 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 493, 503 n.2 (1978).
Although some contend that the due-on-sale clause was originally used by
lenders to protect their security interests, . . . most authorities agree that it was
conceived primarily to combat the rising interest rates of the 1960's. E.g., FEDERAL
NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC MEETING ON CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE
FORMS, S. Doc. No. 92-21, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 147 (1971) (statement of Haydon
M. Calvert, Senior Vice-President, Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion, Salt Lake City, Utah) ...
Id. (citations omitted).
14. See Jacoway, Mortgages-A Catalog and Critique on the Rule of Equity in the
Enforcement of Modern Day "Due-on-Sale" Clauses, 26 ARK. L. Rav. 485, 493.(1973); note
15 infra.
15. The reasons why a lender wishes to keep his loan portfolio in step with the current
market rate of interest are fairly straightforward. Lenders, usually savings and loan associa-
tions, borrow money on a short-term basis from their depositors and lend it on a long-term
basis in the form of mortgages. When the interest rate rises, the cost of borrowing money from
their own depositors increases. At the same time, home buyers wish to assume existing
mortgages to take advantage of the lower rates. Thus, the average life of mortgages in lenders'
portfolios will increase, resulting in a greater than usual number of low-interest loans. 28 CASE
W. Ras. L. REv. 493, 512 (1978). If there is a decrease in the interest rate, the effects will be
minimal since the buyer would not assume the mortgage when he could refinance it at a lower
rate.
The court recognized these economic factors in Wellenkamp, but concluded that if, at a
time of high interest rates, a lender was unwilling to allow assumption of an existing loan
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is a distinct conflict in the various jurisdictions, 0 as well as in the
literature discussing this area of the law, 7 as to whether a lender
should be allowed to enforce a due-on-sale acceleration clause where
impairment of his security is not threatened.
California has addressed the legal consequences of due-on
clauses more often than any other state, and, although not always
predictable, its decisions illustrate the various lines which other
jurisdictions have followed. Since both the majority and dissenting
opinions in Wellenkamp rested their conclusions on these prior
cases, they will be discussed briefly.
Writing for the majority in Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 5 Justice
Traynor concluded that due-on-sale clauses were restraints on alien-
and elected instead to enforce its due-on clause, transfer of the property might be prohibited
entirely, as it might be economically unfeasible for the buyer to acquire a new loan. In the
alternative, the buyer could insist that the seller lower the purchase price, leaving the seller
with the option of either complying and reducing his equity return or refusing to sell. In either
case, the clause hampers alienation. 21 Cal. 3d at 950, 582 P.2d at 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
383-84 (1978) (citing Note, supra note 13, at 1113).
16. See generally Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 725 (1976). For examples of cases allowing auto-
matic enforcement of due-on clauses, see Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181
Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973); Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61111. 2d 119, 333
N.E.2d 1 (1975); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71 Wis. 2d 531, 239 N.W.2d 20 (1976); accord, Crockett v.
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976); Miller v. Pacific First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976).
For examples of cases requiring that the lender show an impairment to its security, see
Patton v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978); Baltimore Life
Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971), rev. denied, 108 Ariz. 192, 494 P.2d
1322 (1972); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972);
Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan As'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974);
Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970); Sanders v. Hicks, 317 So. 2d 61
(Miss. 1975); Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d
1090 (1976).
17. For a good discussion of the opposing viewpoints, see 28 CASE W. RES. L. Rav. 493
(1978), which contains two casenotes on the same case. Other secondary sources include
Bonanno, supra note 13; Volkmer, supra note 7; Note, Beyond Tucker v. Lassen: The Future
of The Due-on-Sale Clause in California, 27 HAsTNGs L.J. 475 (1975); Note, Mortgage Con-
sent To Sale Clause: A Reasonable Restraint on Alienation? 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 513
(1975); Note, Due On Sale and Due On Encumbrance Clauses in California, 7 Lov. L.A. L.
Rav. 306 (1974); Note, supra note 13; Comment, supra note 7; 11 CAL. W. L. Rav. 578 (1975);
22 HAsmNGs L.J. 431 (1971); 47 Miss. L.J. 331.(1976); 7 U. W.L.A. L. REv. 258 (1975).
18. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964). In this case, the bank brought
an action against landowners to foreclose an alleged equitable mortgage created by a security
agreement not to encumber or transfer property in consideration of loans made to them by
the bank. The instrument provided that upon default on the loans, the bank at its election
could accelerate the debt. The borrowers sold the property without the knowledge or the
consent of the bank. The defendants conceded actual knowledge of the agreement. The court
held that the instrument did, in fact, create an equitable mortgage which could be foreclosed
by the bank. While conceding that the instrument was a restraint on alienation, and that
the common law rule makes any such restraint invalid, Justice Traynor concluded that since
the instrument was a reasonable restraint, designed to protect the bank's justifiable interest,
the court should not needlessly invalidate it.
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ation, but he noted that only "unreasonable" restraints against
alienation were unenforceable.' 9 The court failed, however, to
articulate exactly which interests of the mortgagee would justify
the restraint."
In the majority's interpretation of Coast Bank in the instant
case, Justice Manuel stated one interest of the mortgagee that the
court would consider. "In determining whether a due-on clause was
unreasonable in Coast Bank we looked at whether the restraint was
necessary to prevent impairment to the lender's security. 2' In con-
trast, the dissent" construed Coast Bank as standing for the rule
that in an outright sale of property, a due-on-sale clause is reason-
able per se.2 The dissent's interpretation rests on the language of
the Coast Bank decision which "held that it was reasonable for a
lender to condition its continued extension of credit to borrowers 'on
their retaining their interest in the property that stood as
security for the debt.' "24
La Sala v. American Savings & Loan Association2 involved the
exercise of a due-on-encumbrance clause after the borrower had
19. Id. at 317, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
20. Although Justice Traynor identified several judicial decisions which had upheld
reasonable restraints upon alienation, such as spendthrift trusts and restraints on assign-
ments of leases, executory land contracts, life estates and corporate shares, id. at 316-17, 392
P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508, conflicting lines of authority have developed as to what kinds
of circumstances would justify a finding that a restraint was reasonable.
Three lines of authority have developed since Coast Bank. One line construed Coast
Bank as standing for the rule that due-on-sale clauses are reasonable per se. See, e.g., Crock-
ett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 629, 224 S.E.2d 580, 587 (1976).
Another line of authority supports a "money market" theory, thereby justifying enforce-
ment of a due-on-sale clause in order for the lender to take advantage of higher interest rates
if the borrower alienates the property. See Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. 181
Colo. 294, 301, 509 P.2d 1240, 1244 (1973).
Still a third line of authority focuses upon the reasonableness of protecting the security
interest of the lender without balancing the equities, a path taken by subsequent California
cases discussed in notes 25-32 and accompanying text infra. 28 CA~s W. Rs. L. REv. 493,
495-96 n.13. See also Annot., 69 A.L.R.3d 725 (1976) (a collection of the cases following Coast
Bank).
21. 21 Cal. 3d at 948, 582 P.2d at 973, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (emphasis added).
22. Justice Clark was the lone dissenter on a panel of seven justices.
23. 21 Cal. 3d at 954-55, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (Clark, J., dissenting);
see Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 629, 224 S.E.2d 580, 587 (1976).
24. 21 Cal. 3d at 955, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (quoting Coast Bank, 61
Cal. 2d at 317, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508).
25. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
In La Sala, plaintiffs borrowed money from American Savings & Loan Association which
utilized a form deed of trust containing a "due-on-encumbrance" provision. This clause
provided that if the trustor should further encumber the property without the consent of
American, then American had the right, at its option, to accelerate the sums due.
Plaintiffs did execute a note and second deed of trust, and American responded with a
letter offering to waive its right to accelerate in return for payment of a sum of money and
an increase in the rate of interest on the first deed of trust.
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executed a junior encumbrance on the security. In determining
whether the clause was an unreasonable restraint on alienation, the
supreme court considered the possible impairment to the lender's
security and the degree of restraint on alienation of the property.
The court concluded that the degree of restraint on alienation was
significant and that unless the lender could show that enforcement
of the due-on-encumbrance clause was reasonably necessary to pre-
vent impairment of the security, the clause would not be enforced. 6
Three years later in Tucker v. Lassen Savings & Loan
Association," the supreme court was again confronted with a due-
on-sale clause, but this time it was in the context of a borrower
selling the property by installment contract. The court clarified the
test used in La Sala, pointing out that a decision as to whether a
given restraint on alienation was unreasonable required a balancing
of the "quantum of restraint" involved and the "justification" for
so restraining alienation of the property.28 In applying this test, the
court concluded that the quantum of restraint was high and that the
lender had not shown legitimate justifications for it."
Both La Sala and Tucker reaffirmed Coast Bank in their dicta.
It was pointed out that the degree of restraint in an "outright" sale'
was small when the seller received sufficient funds from the sale to
pay off the lender, whereas usually there were not sufficient funds
to pay off the outstanding mortgage in cases involving junior en-
cumbrances or installment land contracts.3' On the other hand,
dicta suggested that the justification for enforcing the restraint
would be greater in an outright sale than in an encumbrance or
installment contract situation. In the latter situations, the borrower
still has a substantial interest in protecting the underlying security,
while in the former situation the borrower is more divorced from the
property.32
In Wellenkamp, the Supreme Court of California refused to
follow the dicta of La Sala and Tucker by denying the lender's
contention that the transfer of an interest in real property made
26. Justice Clark agreed in his Wellenkamp dissent by stating: "[I1f particular circum-
stances indicated the lender's security was endangered" the enforcement of the clause may
be reasonably necessary. 21 Cal. 3d at 955, 582 P.2d at 978, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
27. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
28. Id. at 635-36, 526 P.2d at 1173, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
29. Id. at 637-38, 526 P.2d at 1174-75, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39.
30. The term "outright sale," as used by the court in WeUenkamp, refers to "any sale
by the trustor of property wherein legal title (and usually possession) is transferred." 21 Cal.
3d at 950, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
31. Id. at 949, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
32. Id. at 951-52, 582 P.2d at 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384. Of course if the new buyer
places a large down payment to pay off the seller's equity, he too has a substantial interest
in the property. Id.
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acceleration of the loan a reasonable restraint on alienation per se. 33
After reviewing its prior case law, the majority applied the quantum
of restraint versus the justification for enforcement test, stating:
We first discuss the quantum of restraint imposed by en-
forcement of the due-on clause after transfer of the property-by
outright sale, for if as defendant contends, automatic exercise of
the clause in these circumstances results in little, if any, restraint
on alienation, we need not reach the question whether there exists
justification sufficient to warrant enforcement.3
Justice Manuel had no trouble finding that a considerable
quantum of restraint existed. There are often times when "economic
conditions are such that new financing is either unavailable or eco-
nomically unfeasible, [in which case] the seller and buyer will
normally agree to a form of financing arrangement wherein the
buyer will assume the seller's loan."' In such an instance, if the
lender elects to exercise his due-on-sale clause, the sale, in effect,
will be prohibited because the "buyer will be unable to substitute a
new loan for the loan being called due, and the seller will not receive
33. As noted earlier, the supreme court restricted its opinion to institutional lenders. Id.
at 952 n.9, 582 P.2d at 976 n.9, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384 n.9. This is not surprising given the
court's tendency in this area of limiting its holdings to the specific facts before it. E.g., Tucker
v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974)
(installment loan contract); La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d
1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971) (due-on-encumbrance clause). The quantum of restraint on the
borrower-seller would be the same regardless of whether it was a private or institutional
lender. The court noted, however, that the justification for enforcement of a due-on-sale
clause may be so inherently greater in the case of a private lender that automatic enforcement
would be in order. 21 Cal. 3d at 952 n.9, 582 P.2d at 976 n.9, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384 n.9.
The inherent justification, if one exists, would be that the private lender, upon resale of
the property by the borrower, faces greater risks of default or future waste than the institu-
tional lender. Indeed, the money market theory would provide no justification since private
lenders are not borrowing short and lending long while they try to maintain loan portfolios.
It may be more likely that private lenders set the rate of interest they charge in a manner
which is more subjective and personalized to the particular borrowers than the rate set by
institutional lenders. Once a lending institution determines that a potential borower has
passed a certain threshold level of credit worthiness, it will loan him money at the going
interest rate. Another borrower whose credit may not be as good as the first, but who also
passes the threshold level, will most likely receive a loan at the same rate of interest. A private
lender, however, will not be greatly influenced by the threshold level of credit worthiness and
the going market rate of interest.
The private lender may well use some calculus of objective and subjective factors to
determine what rates he will charge as compensation for the risks he feels he is taking. This
rate might be different for each borrower. Yet, this difference between loans made by private
and institutional lenders does not change the fact that in reality "the buyer in such an
outright sale may be at least as good, if not a better credit risk than the original bor-
rower/seller." Id. at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385. It seems, therefore, that there
is no significant reason for treating private lenders any differently from institutional lenders
regarding automatic enforcement of due-on-sale clauses.
34. 21 Cal. 3d at 949, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
35. Id. at 950, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
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an amount from the buyer sufficient to discharge that loan, particu-
larly when the balance due is substantial."36 Even if the lender offers
to waive acceleration in return for the buyer's assumption of the
existing loan at an increased rate of interest, the restraint on aliena-
tion is apparent 7.3  With the less favorable interest rate, the cost of
the property to the buyer is higher. Thus, the seller may be forced
to lower the purchase price, absorbing the loss himself, or he may
have to refuse to complete the sale and face diminished prospects
of a sale at the same price in the future.1
The defendant Bank of America offered two independent justi-
fications for the quantum of restraint involved. First, the outright
sale of property eliminates any incentive or ability for the borrower-
seller to avoid impairment of the lender's security. Thus, the
lender's risks increase. Second, the effort of the lender to maintain
its loan portfolio at the current market rate of interest would benefit
from the option to accelerate loans. The majority disposed of both
of these arguments.
3
As noted earlier, 0 the lender's security may be impaired either
by waste to the property or by default on the loan, with the conse-
quent costs and delays of foreclosure. The court, however, properly
noted that the new buyer in an outright sale will have to make a
down payment on the purchase, which creates an equity interest in
the buyer. Therefore, the buyer will normally have sufficient incen-
tive not to create waste. Furthermore, the buyer "may be at least
36. Id., 98 2 P.2d at 974-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84.
37. Id. at 950-51, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
38. Id. The dissent argued that it is not the due-on-sale clause which restrains alienation;
rather, it is the very economic climate postulated by the majority. This argument appears
similar to some type of proximate cause requirement. It does not take into account that given
rising interest rates (which give the lender the motive to exercise the due-on clause), the
borrower-seller would not be restrained from alienating his property but for the due-on-sale
clause in his original agreement. Id. at 956, 582 P.2d at 978, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
39. The defendant bank also argued that "inclusion of the due-on clause in the promis-
sory note . ..would make that clause part of the debt itself and therefore automatically
enforceable on that basis." Id. at 953 n.12, 582 P.2d at 976 n.12, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.12.
This argument was apparently based upon a statutory requirement that the clause appear
in both the deed of trust and the note. CAL. CWIL CODE § 2924.5 (West 1978). The supreme
court stated that the purpose of the statutory section was to provide the borrower with notice
and not to allow automatic enforcement on either the deed of trust or the promissory note.
Id.
In Florida, an appellate court has denied automatic enforcement of a due-on-sale clause
in a mortgage while allowing it in a suit upon a promissory note. Compare Clark v. Lachen-
meier, 237 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970) with Stockman v. Burke, 305 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1974). In Stockman, the court distinguished between an action in equity, which required
the lender to show impairment of his security, and an action at law. In light of the policy
considerations regarding restraints on alienation of property, the distinction of the court can
be questioned as putting form above substance.
40. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
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as good, if not a better credit risk than the original bor-
rower/seller."" It is apparent that there are circumstances in which
the security interest is not impaired by the outright sale of property
and, therefore, automatic enforcement of the due-on clause is not
justified on this basis.
In Tucker, the supreme court rejected the money market ra-
tionale with respect to installment land contracts. The court, how-
ever, expressly left open the question of whether this rationale,
which recognizes a lender's interest in maintaining its portfolio at
current interest rates, would provide sufficient justification for the
restraint imposed by the exercise of a due-on clause in the case of
an outright sale.'" Faced with this open question in Wellenkamp, the
court rejected the money market rationale.' 3
The reason of the court for rejecting this rationale was simple.
The due-on clause was designed to protect the lender's security."
Protection against the business risk of fluctuating interest rates,
which the lender undertakes in making any loan, does not further
the purpose for which this restraint on alienation was designed.
Therefore, it was not reasonable "to place the burden of the lender's
mistaken economic projections on property owners exercising their
right to freely alienate their property.""
The underlying logic of the court is sound. There is no logical
nexus between the sale of property (or the transfer of a "lesser"
interest) and the lender's readjustment of its loan portfolio. As far
as the lender is concerned, the sale is a fortuitous circumstance."
Depending upon the economic conditions, rather than on the char-
acteristics of either the property, the borrower-seller or the new
buyer, the lender will determine whether or not to exercise the due-
on clause.
In support of the money market rationale, it has been argued
that "present and future borrowers pay the added cost of preserving
bargain rates for those home buyers who assume low-interest mort-
gages."' 7 Without the due-on-sale clause, lending institutions will
have to raise interest rates to compensate themselves for the greater
proportion of low-interest loans they would have in their portfolios
41. 21 Cal. 3d at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (emphasis added).
42. 12 Cal. 3d at 639 n.10, 526 P.2d at 1175 n.10, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639 n.10.
43. 21 Cal. 3d at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
44. See notes 6-13 and accompanying text supra.
45. 21 Cal. 3d at 953, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
46. Of course, a lending institution could estimate how often it would get the oppor-
tunity to exercise a due-on-sale clause, but it could not control or even anticipate when any
individual borrower would act in such a manner as to activate the due-on clause.
47. 28 CASE W. RES. L. Rzv. 493, 512 (1978); see Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 301-03, 509 P.2d 1240, 1244-45 (1973).
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due to home buyers assuming mortgages during periods of rising
mortgage rates." Thus, the question has been posed: "[W]ho
should benefit from an increase in interest rates?" 9
In Wellenkamp, it appears the court implicitly answered this
question when it recognized that "a restraint on alienation cannot
be found reasonable merely because it is commercially beneficial to
the restrainor. Otherwise, one could justify any restraint on aliena-
tion upon the ground that the lender could exact a valuable consid-
eration in return for its waiver, and that sensible lenders find such
devices profitable." 5 The lending institution incorporates its pre-
diction of future rates into the current long-term rate it charges. If,
in the future, the projections prove incorrect, the lender will not
have as high a profit margin as anticipated. Without due-on-sale
clauses to help the lender maintain its loan portfolio at the then
current interest rate, it is possible that some of the loss will be made
up by charging a higher interest rate on new loans."' To some degree
a lender's losses will always be passed on to the consumer, but this
consequence alone cannot justify favoring the lender.
Alternatives to the due-on-sale clause exist in many jurisdic-
tions. One of these is the variable interest rate mortgage. " Another
48. See Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 301-03, 509 P.2d 1240,
1244-45 (1973).
Additionally, lending institutions assert that [due-on-sale clauses] serve a
public need in supplying loan funds. Their contention is that uniform mortgage
contracts with flexible provisions, such as [these clauses], facilitate the transfer
of mortgages between lenders in various parts of the country. Thus, cash can more
readily flow from areas with a surplus of funds to areas with an abundance of
borrowers and a shortage of cash.
Comment, supra note 7, at 594.
49. 28 CAsE W. Ras. L. Rav. 493, 513 (1978).
50. 21 Cal. 3d at 953, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (quoting La Sala, 5 Cal. 3d
at 880-81 n.17, 489 P.2d at 1124 n. 17, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860 n.17).
51. This, of course, assumes that competition for borrowers amongst the various lending
institutions will permit the lender to charge a higher rate.
52. For a discussion of the variable interest rate mortgage versus the due-on-sale clause,
see Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973).
A variable interest rate mortgage gives the mortgagee the ability to charge an interest
rate, within prescribed statutory limits, throughout the duration of the loan. The advantages
of such mortgages is that they allow the mortgagee to offer a more competitive initial rate.
Additionally, borrowers may be more willing to accept a higher initial rate because the type
of mortgage also allows the possibility of interest rate reductions.
While variable rate mortgages may be good for those who expect their income to increase
with time, it is undesirable for those on a fixed income.
Some states have statutes which specifically endorse or proscribe the variable interest
rate mortgage, while other states allow it without any statutory enactment. E.g., CAL. CIvL
CODE § 1916.5 (West 1978) (allowing variable interest rates); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 74, § 4(d)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) (proscribing); MIn. COMP. LAws ANN. § 438.31c(2) (Supp. 1976)
(proscribing); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 334.01 (West 1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 41(a) (1970)
(proscribing). The use of the variable interest rate is also prohibited to federal savings and
loan associations. 12 C.F.R. § 541.14(a) (1977).
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alternative is making renegotiation of the interest rate part of the
loan agreement. Neither of these alternatives would interfere with
the borrower's right to alienate his property.
Finally, it should be noted that the borrower will not always
refinance the loan if the interest rate falls.53 One disadvantage to
this is that many instruments have prepayment charges written into
the loan agreement to discourage refinancing.5 Another factor de-
terring refinancing is simply the fact of borrower inertia.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of California has issued a
well-reasoned opinion in Wellenkamp which will be influential in
the many jurisictions which have not yet addressed the validity and
construction of a due-on-sale clause contained in a promissory note
or deed of trust. The court has effectively placed the burden upon
the lender to show that the enforcement of a due-on-sale clause is
reasonably necessary to protect against impairment of its security
through waste or increase in the risk of default, thereby justifying a
restraint on the alienation of property. In so doing, the court has
rejected the money market rationale and continued to protectthe
free alienability of property. By insisting that a due-on clause can-
not be enforced upon the occurrence of an outright sale unless the
lender can demonstrate the need for protection of its justifiable
interests, the court has rejected any form of a per se rule and has
equitably balanced the interests of lender and borrower.
ROBERT GALT
53. See Note, supra note 13, at 1126.
54. 28 CAsE W. Ras. L. REv. 493, 513 n.50 (1978).
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